The Autumn of the (Georgian) Patriarch. The role of the Orthodox Church in Georgia and in Georgian politics. OSW Commentary 2020-05-18. by Górecki, Wojciech
CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES NUMBER 332  18.05.2020 www.osw.waw.pl
OSW Commentary
The views expressed by the authors of the papers 
do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota,
Szymon Sztyk, Tomasz Strzelczyk
TRANSLATION: Magdalena Klimowicz
CO-OPERATION: Nicholas Furnival
DTP: Wojciech MańkowskiCentre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw,  Poland
tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, info@osw.waw.pl
             www.osw.waw.pl
The outstanding role in the history
In an independent Georgia, the “national” Church 
is playing a prominent state- and nation-forming 
role. The privileged status of the GOC is stipulated 
in Article 8 of the Georgian constitution: “Along 
with freedom of belief and religion, the State shall 
recognise the outstanding role of the Apostolic 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia in 
the history of Georgia, and its independence 
from the State. The relationship between the 
state of Georgia and the Apostolic Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church of Georgia shall be determined 
by a constitutional agreement, which shall be 
in full compliance with the universally recognised 
principles and norms of international law in the 
area of human rights and freedoms”.1 The agree-
ment mentioned in the text, or concordat, was 
signed on 14 October 2002 by the then President 
Eduard Shevardnadze and Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia 
II. It confirms (among other things) that churches, 
including those in ruins and those defunct, are in 
the possession of the Church, it grants the GOC 
the exclusive right to establish a military ordinari-
1 The English language version of the constitution is available 
on the website of the Legislative Herald of Georgia (www.
matsne.gov.ge/en), which also contains the Georgian and 
Russian language versions.
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The role of the Orthodox Church in Georgia and in Georgian politics
Wojciech Górecki
Analyses dedicated to Georgia’s domestic situation usually omit the religious aspect and the relation 
between the state and the country’s predominant religious organisation, i.e. the autocephalous Geor-
gian Orthodox Church (GOC). The relatively few papers focused on this particular issue are exceptions. 
Meanwhile, the fact that Georgians as a nation are very devout (religion is an element of their national 
identity) and that Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II is an indisputable authority has a direct impact on the 
choices they make and on the policy pursued by the state. It can be said that one important reason 
behind the electoral success of Georgian Dream in 2012 was the support offered, albeit informally, 
by hierarchs of the GOC to the party’s leader Bidzina Ivanishvili. Easter celebrations attended by large 
numbers of believers on 19 April 2020 were an open display of the GOC’s power. The celebrations 
took place despite the restrictions due to a state of emergency declared nationwide in connection 
with the epidemic. Moreover, the GOC is on the eve of a succession – Ilia II who has been patriarch 
for more than 42 years, recently turned 87. This is causing internal tension in the Church which in 
turn acts as a catalyst for accelerating secularisation.
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ate, authorises the GOC to perform educational 
activity, and introduces concordat marriages.2
One Caucasus scholar from Poland has pointed 
to three reasons behind the special role the GOC 
has played in the history of the Georgian state and 
nation: “First, although [the GOC] emerged just as 
the other Eastern Churches, i.e. at the beginning 
it was dependent on the secular system of power, 
the latter’s gradual weakening has enabled it 
to gain significant independence… Second, over 
the first centuries of Georgian statehood, the 
Georgian Orthodox Church gained the status of 
the creator of national culture and of national 
and historical identity derived from this culture… 
Third, the process of how the contemporary face 
of the Church in Georgia is being shaped is largely 
impacted by the fact that after more than two 
centuries the position of this Church is determined 
by its relations with its own Georgian state, rather 
than a foreign one”.3 It should be noted that in 
1811, following Russia’s conquest of Georgia, the 
tsarist authorities cancelled the GOC’s autocephaly 
(it was reinstated in 1943 on the orders of Stalin 
who, during the war, for tactical reasons, slightly 
liberalised the Soviet state’s religious policy).
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
GOC gradually consolidated its position, which 
was facilitated by the policy pursued by the Cathol-
icos-Patriarch, who repeatedly acted as a mediator 
between the government and the opposition:
2 The English language version of the concordat is available 
on the Freedom of Religion or Belief website, www.forb-
caucausus.wordpress.com.
3 A. Furier, Droga Gruzji do niepodległości, Poznań 2000, p. 152.
“Both sides of the conflict readily reached out 
to him for help because they were aware of the 
weakness of the institution he headed. It seemed 
that the Catholicos-Patriarch’s involvement in 
events did not threaten the balance of power in 
place at that time”.4 In the following years, Ilia II 
did not refuse to act as a mediator and frequently 
spoke in public about issues of major importance 
to the country. In his speeches, he never openly 
supported any political party, instead calling on 
the public figures to engage in dialogue and 
to take responsibility for the state.5 Headed by him 
for many years, the Church has become a strong 
institution independent of the secular authorities, 
one with solid financial resources, a large number 
of adherents and a special status stipulated in the 
constitution. Georgia’s most prominent politicians 
make efforts to meet with Ilia II from time to time, 
viewing these contacts as an additional means 
of boosting the legitimacy of their own position.
Polls, including those conducted by the Interna-
tional Republican Institute, confirm that the GOC 
enjoys high levels of public support. In spring 
2018, 84% of the respondents said their opinion 
towards the GOC was favourable (8% said it was 
unfavourable and another 8% had no opinion)6 
and in autumn 2019 the corresponding proportion 
was 85% (with 10% unfavourable and 4% with 
no opinion).7 The proportion of positive answers 
correspond with a high level of religiosity among 
Georgians and into their respect for conservative, 
traditional values. In a survey conducted by the 
Pew Research Center at the end of 2018, 50% of 
Georgia’s adult population said that they were 
highly religious, which placed Georgia third from 
4 Ibid, p. 150.
5 For example following the publication, ahead of the 2012 
parliamentary elections, of recordings documenting a bru-
tal crackdown on prison inmates, the Catholicos-Patriarch 
called on the young demonstrators and to the authorities 
to refrain from escalating the conflict (J. Brodowski, Gruzja 
po rewolucji róż. Obraz przemian polityczno-społecznych 
w latach 2003–2018, Kraków 2019, p. 90).
6 Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia, International 
Republican Institute, 10–22 April 2018, www.iri.org. The 
army was ranked second (83% of positive replies), the media 
placed third (68%), and the police was fourth (50%).
7 Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia, International 
Republican Institute, September–October 2019, www.iri.org. 
In this survey, the army was ranked first (86% of positive 
replies), the media third (72%), and the police fourth (59%).
Society’s high level of trust in the 
Church corresponds with Georgians’ 
declared high religiosity.
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the 34 European countries in which this poll was 
conducted. The top five also included three other 
countries inhabited by a large Orthodox population 
(i.e. Romania, Greece and Moldova) and Armenia.8
Another Pew Research Center survey carried out 
around this time showed that 81% of Georgian 
respondents said that religion was an important 
or very important element of national identity. The 
only country with a higher proportion of positive 
answers to this question was Armenia with 82%. 
3% of the respondents (Europe’s lowest propor-
tion) approved of same-sex marriages, and 10% 
(again Europe’s lowest proportion) approved of 
legal abortion procedures.9
The correlation between conservative views and 
religiosity is most evident in people’s attitudes 
to moral issues. One topic that attracts media at-
tention each year is the attempts to organise pride 
parades in Tbilisi. On 17 May 2013 an event organ-
ised by the LGBT community to celebrate the Inter-
national Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and 
Biphobia, was dispersed by Orthodox activists led 
by priests (28 individuals were injured)10. In 2016 
a photo of a priest attacking the parade participants 
with a chair made headlines, and in 2018 the parade 
was cancelled due to security concerns.
8 J. Evans, Ch. Baronavski, How do European countries differ 
in religious commitment?, Pew Research Center, 5 Decem-
ber 2018, www.pewresearch.org. According to the 2014 
census, Georgia’s population was 3.7 million individuals 
(ethnic Georgians accounted for 86.8% of the population, 
Azerbaijanis – made up 6.3%, Armenians – 4.5%, Rus-
sians – 0.7%, Ossetians – 0.4%). The predominant religion 
was Orthodoxy – with 83.4%, the proportion of Muslims 
was 10.7%, members of the Armenian Apostolic Church 
accounted for 2.9% of the population, and members of 
the Roman Catholic Church – for 0.5%. The census was 
not performed in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. See 2014 General Population Census. Main 
Results. General Information, National Statistics Office of 
Georgia (Geostat), 28 April 2016, www.census.ge.
9 Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of 
Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues, Pew 
Research Center, 29 October 2018, www.pewresearch.org.
10 M. Matusiak, ‘Georgia – between a dream and reality’, OSW 
Commentary, no. 133, 15 April 2014, www.osw.waw.pl.
Tension during Saakashvili’s rule
In the context of these figures, it seems paradoxi-
cal that among the former Soviet republics it was 
Georgia (along with the Baltic states) which has 
been the most consistent in its efforts to inte-
grate with the institutional West. Georgia’s first 
president Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990–1992) pur-
sued a pro-Western policy. This was resumed by 
Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003) at the turn of 
the 20th and the 21st centuries, following a thaw 
in Georgian-Russian relations. The subsequent 
president, Mikheil Saakashvili (who was in office 
in 2004–2013), made his country’s Westernisa-
tion his political credo. Georgian Dream, which 
has ruled Georgia since 2012, did not abandon 
this political line and merely amended it slightly. 
There are many indications that Georgians view 
their country’s alliance with the West as a political 
and geostrategic choice (in a referendum held on 
5 January 2008 more than 75% of the respond-
ents supported Georgia’s membership of NATO). 
However, in the cultural sense and as regards their 
world view, they are closer to Armenia and even 
the hostile, but Orthodox, Russia.
The relations between the state authorities and 
the Church authorities were coolest during the 
rule of Mikheil Saakashvili. The main source of 
tension was the country’s large-scale Westernisa-
tion being carried out at that time. This triggered 
resistance on the part of conservative representa-
tives of the clergy and the faithful (the direction 
and the pace of transformation were consistent 
with Saakashvili’s modernisation project which 
covered all realms of life, including pop culture). 
This process also covered legislative changes in-
tended at harmonising the Georgian legislation 
with Western standards (some amendments, for 
example those regarding “equal status” issues, 
were enacted upon recommendation from Euro-
During the rule of Mikheil Saakash-
vili, the Church feared that it might 
become dominated by the secular 
authorities.
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pean institutions11). The president recognised the 
importance of the Church and, for example, sup-
ported the re-Christianisation of Adjara, arguing 
that a good Georgian is an Orthodox Georgian.12 
However, his autocratic style of governance and 
almost obsessive attempts to consolidate the state 
made the GOC hierarchs fear that the Church 
might become dominated by the state authorities.
What was probably the most serious crisis was 
triggered by an amendment to the Georgian civil 
code which came into effect on 6 July 2011. Ac-
cording to the new legislation, all confessional 
groups can be granted the status of a “legal per-
son under public law” – which had formerly been 
reserved for the Georgian Orthodox Church. The 
amendment was enacted in spite of the lack of 
consent from both the opposition and Ilia II who 
considered it divergent from the interests of the 
GOC and of the country. The opponents of the 
new legislation worried above all that it might in 
the first place strengthen the Armenian Apostolic 
Church, which in Georgia struggled to regain its 
former churches. In the following days, rallies 
against the new law were held in Tbilisi gathering 
several thousands of protesters. Although the Holy 
Synod of the Georgian Orthodox Church finally 
admitted that representatives of all religions are 
equal in legal terms and called on the protest-
ers to calm down, the hierarchs demanded that 
the state authorities should consult all matters 
regarding religion with the Church and establish 
a joint committee to supervise the implementa-
11 This process was continued after the end of Saakashvili’s 
presidency and resulted from commitments Tbilisi had 
made in connection with the EU-Georgia Association 
Agreement and with the negotiations regarding the lift-
ing of the Schengen visa regime. For example on 2 May 
2014, the Georgian parliament passed the so-called “non-
discrimination act” prohibiting harassment on grounds 
of sexual orientation and gender identity. This sparked 
protests from groups associated with the GOC.
12 Adjara, which enjoys the status of an autonomous republic, 
belonged to the Ottoman Empire until 1878, which is why 
many local Georgians are Muslims. See W. Górecki, Toast 
za przodków, Wołowiec 2017, p. 246–251.
tion of commitments arising from the concordat 
and the constitution. President Saakashvili feared 
that a long-term deterioration in the relations be-
tween the ruling camp and the Church might have 
a negative impact on the government’s approval 
rating ahead of parliamentary elections in 2012 
and the presidential election in 2013. Therefore, 
only one day after the statement issued by the Holy 
Synod, the spokeswoman for President Saakashvili 
assured the public that the state was not going 
to challenge the GOC’s special status and role, and 
that the enacted amendment had no connection 
with possible property-related disputes.13
Among friends and enemies
Ahead of the 2012 parliamentary elections, many 
hierarchs offered their informal support to Geor-
gian Dream and its founder and leader – the 
billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, which certainly 
contributed to the party’s success (Ivanishvili 
financially supported numerous churches and ini-
tiatives carried out by the GOC). Georgian Dream 
seized full power in 2013, when its nominee 
was elected president. This was followed by an 
increase in aggression on the part of Orthodox 
priests and believers targeting representatives 
of minority groups. This situation was likely the 
result of the liberalisation that followed Saakash-
vili’s tough policy of “zero tolerance” for crime. 
For example, on 26 August 2013 in a village 
inhabited by both the Orthodox and Muslim 
Georgians, the local authorities dismantled the 
minaret of the local mosque. The reasons given 
for this were that its construction was unauthor-
ised, and that there had been irregularities in its 
importation from Turkey. This triggered protests 
on the part of the Muslim community, which 
in turn sparked riots organised by conservative 
Orthodox groups. To discharge the tension, Ilia II 
intervened in person and reached an agreement 
with Georgia’s Muslim community leaders.14
13 W. Górecki, ‘Napięcie na linii państwo–Cerkiew w Gruzji’, 
Nowa Europa Wschodnia 2011, no. 5, p. 12.
14 M. Matusiak, ‘Georgia: Is conservative-nationalist sentiment 
growing?’, 4 September 2013, www.osw.waw.pl.
Ahead of the 2012 elections, many 
hierarchs offered their informal 
support to Georgian Dream and its 
leader Bidzina Ivanishvili. 
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Members of the Roman Catholic Church are also 
the target of hostility. Protests and accusations 
of proselytising, although completely ground-
less, were voiced during two papal pilgrimages 
to Georgia: of Pope John Paul II in 1999 and Pope 
Francis in 2016. (The latter pilgrimage met with 
even harsher criticism because at that time the 
Georgian Orthodox Church was stronger than 
a decade and half earlier; no official delegation 
of the GOC attended the papal mass, although 
the Catholicos-Patriarch himself did meet with 
the Pope). In Georgia, Roman Catholic churches 
are being taken over by Orthodox parishes (for 
example in Gori and Samtskhe-Javakheti region), 
there has been a rise in the religious harassment 
of employees and also a rise in attacks – mostly 
verbal – on groups of pilgrims and camps organ-
ised by Catholic priests and monks. These inci-
dents are for example reported in Polish Catholic 
press which on the whole is favourably inclined 
towards Georgia.15
The attitude towards Catholics is what brings the 
GOC and the Russian Orthodox Church increas-
ingly closer to each other. The two Churches have 
numerous personal ties, for example (just with 
many other hierarchs, including some younger 
ones), Ilia II graduated from the Moscow Theo-
logical Academy16. They share their distrust or 
even aversion to the West as broadly understood, 
and their respect for conservative values. Another 
factor important for their relationship is the fact 
that the Russian Orthodox Church has not rec-
ognised the separation of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia from Georgia and considers the two para-
states as the canonical territory of the Georgian 
15 A. Tomczyk, ‘Katolicyzm zanika w Gruzji’, Idziemy, no. 3, 
19 January 2020.
16 In Georgia, collaboration between the GOC’s clergy and 
Soviet-era security institutions has never been the subject 
of a major debate.
Orthodox Church.17 For these reasons, most Geor-
gian hierarchs support cooperation with Russia, 
and the GOC as a whole is viewed as a primarily 
pro-Russian force (those hierarchs who are open 
to cooperation with the West do not form any 
separate group or centre).
The relations between the two Churches are also 
impacted by the establishment of the Orthodox 
Church of Ukraine, which occurred at the turn 
of 2018 and 2019. The GOC has not yet decided 
whether to recognise the new Church. Recogni-
tion could contribute to a further deterioration 
in Georgian-Russian relations because it would 
extend the political conflict to the realm of re-
ligion. On the other hand, refusal to recognise 
the Orthodox Church of Ukraine would translate 
into cooler relations with Kyiv. At the beginning 
of 2019, one Georgian hierarch announced that 
the decision would be made once the hierarchs 
have acquainted themselves with the text of the 
tomos issued by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Constantinople regarding autocephaly; however, 
he did not say when this is expected to happen.18 
In this situation, individual bishops began to speak 
out, both for or against recognising the Orthodox 
Church of Ukraine. Their opinion is obviously of no 
significance compared with the decision of the 
Holy Synod of the GOC, although it is suggestive 
of the balance of power within the body of hier-
archs. According to information obtained by the 
Jamestown Foundation, 9 out of 47 bishops sup-
port the Ukrainian autocephaly; this group includes 
the heads of those eparchies of the GOC which 
cover Western countries.19 It cannot be ruled out 
17 The likely reason behind this situation was a political deci-
sion by the Kremlin following the Russian-Georgian war 
in 2008. It has enabled Moscow to influence Georgian 
believers via pro-Russian clerics (this is Russia’s major soft 
power instrument). It also seems that in the situation of 
broken diplomatic relations, an additional exclusive chan-
nel of bilateral communication was of major importance. 
Formal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parts 
of Georgia (in the canonical sense) does not change the 
fact that Georgian priests are not allowed to enter these 
para-states, which have their own local clerics who are 
closely tied to Russia.
18 ‘ГПЦ огласит решение по Украинской церкви после 
ознакомления с томосом’, Эхо Кавказа, 6 January 2019, 
www.ekhokavkaza.com.
19 G. Menabde, The Battle for Political Influence in the Geor-
gian Orthodox Church, The Jamestown Foundation, 16 July 
2019, www.jamestown.org.
The Georgian Orthodox Church as 
a whole is viewed as a primarily 
pro-Russian force.
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that the decision will only be made by Ilia II’s suc-
cessor and will depend on who this person is (see 
further – Summary and an attempt at a forecast).
Succession in instalments
The Catholicos-Patriarch’s advanced age and poor 
health have for several years prompted questions 
regarding the course of the succession and the suc-
cessor himself. There is little available and credible 
information on the predominant feeling among 
the GOC’s hierarchs, although the disclosed details 
suggest that intensive rivalry and struggle for influ-
ence are ongoing. Particular attention should be 
paid to the fact that on 23 November 2017 Ilia II 
nominated Bishop Shio, metropolitan of the dio-
cese (eparchy) of Senaki and Chkhorotsku, as the 
“guardian of the patriarch’s throne”.20 Although the 
powers of the “guardian” are limited to managing 
the Church should the Catholicos-Patriarch die or 
become unable to perform his duties, the recent 
announcement by Jacob, bishop of Bodbe dio-
cese, suggests that the candidacy of Bishop Shio 
might be acceptable to the Georgian leadership, 
including Bidzina Ivanishvili. On 26 October 2019, 
in an interview for the independent TV station 
Pirveli, Bishop Jacob said that three prominent 
state officials, including former prime minister 
Giorgi Kvirikashvili, had persuaded him to take 
part in a plot against Ilia II. Allegedly, Metropolitan 
Shio was to replace Ilia II.21 Earlier, on 2 February 
2017, Protoiereus Giorgi Mamaladze, a staffer at 
the patriarchate, was detained at Tbilisi airport 
and accused of plotting an attempt on the life 
of the Catholicos-Patriarch. The cleric had report-
edly been carrying a firearm and poison and was 
about to board a plane to Berlin, where Ilia II 
was undergoing medical treatment. According 
to one version, Ilia II would be the victim of the 
attempted attack. However, according to another 
version, the one assumed by the court in Tbilisi, 
the Catholicos-Patriarch’s personal secretary was 
the target. In September 2017, Mamaladze was 
20 The Latin term is “locum tenens” which literally means 
“the place holder”.
21 See ‘Епископ Иаков: „При участии властей готовилось 
покушение на Илию Второго”’, Эхо Кавказа, 26 October 
2019, www.ekhokavkaza.com.
sentenced to nine years in prison, however, some 
clerics argued that he had become entangled in 
the assassination plot as a result of an intrigue 
within the patriarchate.
The weeks that preceded this year’s Easter (which 
in some Churches, including the GOC, was cel-
ebrated on 19 April 2020) saw a confrontation 
between Ilia II and the state authorities – which 
the Catholicos-Patriarch won out. Unlike in the 
case of the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, all over Georgia most 
churches belonging to the GOC remained open 
(the GOC churches located abroad were closed) 
and held an Easter liturgy. This happened in spite 
of appeals from President Salome Zourabich-
vili and Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, who an-
nounced that they would stay at home and tried 
to persuade Georgian citizens to do the same. 
The GOC’s authorities agreed that the attendees 
should maintain a safe distance from each other 
(some had to stand outside the churches) and 
remain on the church premises during curfew 
hours (between 9 pm and 6 am), in line with 
the restrictions imposed as part of a state of 
emergency (which was declared on 21 March 
and which remained in force until 22 May). The 
patriarchate called on individuals from high-risk 
groups (ill people, senior citizens and children, as 
well as “all those who fear that they may contract 
the virus”) to stay at home. It was announced that 
staying at home will would not be considered 
a sin. In response to this, five days before Easter, 
Prime Minister Gakharia issued a statement in 
which he tried to present these restrictions as 
a difficult compromise: “In this case I am con-
vinced that every reasonable, wise citizen will 
understand [this] and will not shift responsibility 
onto the Church or wait for the Church to call on 
everyone to refrain from attending a mass or for 
the state to call for [believers] to not breaking the 
law. This is the answer and the golden mean and 
The process of succession – the first 
since the collapse of the USSR – will 
be the most difficult test for the 
Church.
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I am convinced that each citizen will find the best 
solution [for themselves]”.22
It seems that Ilia II has used the threat posed 
by the epidemic to strengthen his position re-
garding the state authorities and to demonstrate 
that he is efficiently supervising the Church – only 
a small number of parishes did not hold Easter 
liturgies. Perhaps this is what he needed to force 
through a candidate for his successor whom he 
would approve of himself (this, obviously, is sheer 
speculation). Contrary to pessimistic forecasts, 
the number of individuals infected with the novel 
coronavirus has not increased significantly since 
Easter: on 19 April the figure was 399, whereas 
a fortnight later – on 5 May – it was 593 (the num-
ber of fatalities was 4 and 9, respectively).23 These 
figures have additionally boosted the position 
of the leader of the Georgian Orthodox Church.
Summary and an attempt at a forecast
The Georgian Orthodox Church is facing the most 
difficult test in its modern history – the first suc-
cession after the collapse of the USSR. Each sub-
sequent Catholicos-Patriarch, even if he turns 
out to be an excellent organiser and diplomat, 
will be a weaker leader than Ilia II because he 
will not have his achievements and position built 
over several decades. Moreover, the period of Ilia 
II’s leadership of the GOC includes the country’s 
watershed moment of regained independence, 
when he had to rebuild the Church structures 
from scratch. The Georgian Orthodox Church 
will remain a major political actor that the state 
authorities will always need to take into account. 
However, it cannot be ruled out that it will be 
unable to manoeuvre as efficiently (both domesti-
cally and in the international arena) as it has done 
during Ilia II’s leadership – for example when it 
comes to recognising the autocephaly of the 
Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Nor can it be ruled 
out that under a new leader the GOC will yield 
to pressure from the Russian Orthodox Church and 
22 ‘Георгий Гахария: Церковь не закроется, особенно 
в пасхальную ночь’, Эхо Кавказа, 14 April 2020, www.
ekhokavkaza.com.
23 See figures updated on an ongoing basis available on the 
Georgian government’s website StopCov.ge, www.stopcov.ge.
will ultimately refuse to recognise the Ukrainian 
autocephaly.24 In this situation, it remains unclear 
how Tbilisi’s foreign policy will evolve and whether 
it may possibly become more pro-Russian.
At least in the coming years, the Georgian Or-
thodox Church will maintain its major impact on 
society which is likely continue to be conservative. 
However, just as in other countries, society will as-
sumedly gradually become secularised, which will 
pose a major challenge to priests and hierarchs.25 
Domestic violence will be among the issues which 
in the future are likely to become the subject of 
public debate questioning the patriarchal family 
model.26 On the other hand, the practical de-
criminalisation of marijuana smoking announced 
on 30 July 2018 by the Georgian Constitutional 
Court (which ruled that penalising citizens for 
smoking marijuana is unconstitutional) is one sign 
of a gradual liberalisation criticised by numerous 
GOC hierarchs (including for its “Western” style).27
Without the authority of Ilia II, the increasingly fre-
quent intrigues and scandals within the GOC may 
contribute to a more intensive outflow of believers. 
(Besides the developments discussed earlier in the 
text, events reported in recent months included 
a bishop claiming that the Catholicos-Patriarch is 
homosexual28 and a shooting incident in a monas-
tery in central Georgia which the Church authori-
ties attempted to cover up).29
24 One Russian hierarch suggested that should the GOC rec-
ognise the autocephaly, the Russian Church might consider 
recognising the Church of Abkhazia. See TV programme 
Церковь и мир aired on 26 January 2019, www.vesti.ru.
25 LGBT interest groups are among those who distance them-
selves most from the GOC. See for example: W. Wojtasiewicz, 
‘Środowiska LGBT pod ostrzałem społeczeństwa, cerkwi 
i polityków’, Polityka, 3 June 2018, www.polityka.pl.
26 See for example: S. Budzisz, Pokazucha. Na gruzińskich 
zasadach, Poznań 2019.
27 Decriminalisation happened as a result of youth protests, 
the so-called NarcoMaidan, backed by a portion of politi-
cians, and of lobbying activities carried out by various social 
movements and the Girchi party (“girchi” is Georgian for 
“cone”). Decriminalisation is not complete, though – consum-
ing the drug in the presence of children and in public places, 
as well as storing it, continues to be illegal. See W. Górecki, 
‘Rok 2018 na Kaukazie Południowym. To przyszła młodość’, 
Nowa Europa Wschodnia 2019, no. 2.
28 Д. Мониава, ‘А потом мы каялись...’, Эхо Кавказа, 11 No-
vember 2019, www.ekhokavkaza.com.
29 В. Унанянц, ‘Церковный стрелок. Испытания Иова’, Эхо 
Кавказа, 29 April 2020, www.ekhokavkaza.com.
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Paradoxically, the GOC’s power (measured by the 
number of believers, parishes and churches, as 
well as by the scope of legal provisions granting 
it privileged treatment) may turn out to be its 
greatest weakness. This power is the source of 
the popular belief (which at present is very true) 
that the GOC enjoys a special status in the Geor-
gian state and society. However, although in the 
immediate future this status seems undisputed, 
in the more distant future, due to the above-
mentioned factors, it is likely to erode. As long 
as the Church does not need to worry about 
government reshuffles, economic problems and 
new social phenomena, its leadership may fail to 
notice the signs of this erosion and also fail to 
launch the relevant preventive actions. Further-
more, its failure to respond to new challenges 
or to offer an inappropriate or belated response 
may accelerate this potential erosion. However, 
regardless of the possible future problems, the 
Church’s key importance in Georgia’s history, 
including in its most turbulent periods, and its 
involvement in building Georgia’s culture and 
identity are unquestioned.
Appendix
The profile of Ilia II, the 80th Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia
Ilia II was born on 4 January 1933 in Ordzhonikidze (now Vladikavkaz) in North Ossetia as Irakli Ghu-
dushauri-Shiolashvili. He grew up in a multi-ethnic community including Georgians, Ossetians, Rus-
sians, Armenians and Ingush people. He graduated from the Moscow Theological Seminary (in 1956) 
and the Moscow Theological Academy (in 1960). He was ordained as a monk in Tbilisi back in 1957.
He started his work in Batumi, in 1963 he was consecrated as a bishop and in 1969 as a metropolitan. 
He headed the Eparchy of Tskhum-Abkhazia and at the same time was rector of a seminary in Mtskheta.
On 23 December 1977, he was chosen to be the 80th Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, the head of 
the Georgian Orthodox Church. In 1978–1983, he was co-president of the World Council of Churches 
(in 1997 the GOC announced its withdrawal from this organisation).
